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Much of political debate focuses on the concern that machines might take over. Yet in many domains it is
much more plausible that the ultimate choice and responsibility remain with a human decision-maker, but
that she is provided with machine advice. A quintessential illustration is the decision of a judge to bail or jail a
defendant. In multiple jurisdictions in the US, judges have access to a machine prediction about a defendant’s
recidivism risk. In our study, we explore how receiving machine advice influences people’s bail decisions.
We run a vignette experiment with laypersons whom we test on a subsample of cases from the database of
this prediction tool. In study 1, we ask them to predict whether defendants will recidivate before tried, and
manipulate whether they have access to machine advice. We find that receiving machine advice has a small
effect, which is biased in the direction of predicting no recidivism.
In the field, human decision makers sometimes have a chance, after the fact, to learn whether the machine
has given good advice. In study 2, after each trial we inform participants of ground truth. This does not make
it more likely that they follow the advice, despite the fact that the machine is (on average) slightly more
accurate than real judges. This also holds if initially the advice is mostly correct, or if it initially is mostly to
predict (no) recidivism.
Real judges know that their decisions affect defendants’ lives. They may also be concerned about reelection
or promotion. Hence a lot is at stake. In study 3 we emulate high stakes by giving participants a financial
incentive. An incentive to find the ground truth, or to avoid false positive or false negatives, does not make
participants more sensitive to machine advice. But an incentive to follow the advice is effective.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Research question. In the artificial intelligence literature, man and machine are sometimes
portrayed as competitors. Machines (data-driven algorithms) compete with humans, say on playing
chess. The machine tries to beat its human counterpart. Yet in multiple practical applications, it is
not plausible that human decision-makers are completely replaced by machines. A human-machine
symbiosis [48] is much more likely, with humans keeping responsibility for the decisions, but
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relying on machine decision aids. In a typical situation, the machine suggests a decision, but the
ultimate human decision-maker keeps the right and the ability to override this suggestion.
On first reading, this collaboration promises an improvement in decision quality. Before making
the final decision, the human decision-maker has access to advice. The advice from the machine
can exploit the comparative advantages of machines over humans. The advice may for instance
exploit a much larger training dataset than a human decision-maker might ever see in her lifetime.
The advice might be less prone to certain types of bias, since the machine is not liable to motivated
reasoning [10, 47]. Yet the advantage presupposes that human decision-makers use the advice
appropriately. We run a series of experiments to investigate whether machine advice actually
improves the quality of human decisions. We focus on accuracy.
Legal application. One context in which machine advice is already used regularly is judicial
decision-making. Judges in various jurisdictions in the United States are using the COMPAS tool
[4] to help them decide when to grant someone bail. They are presented with a machine-generated
evaluation of the defendant’s risk of committing another crime before being tried. The tool uses
machine learning methods to assess this risk. It exploits a large training dataset to distill indicators,
and in particular combinations of multiple indicators, to increase the accuracy of the prediction.
Yet earlier work has shown that, on average, COMPAS makes correct predictions in only slightly
more than 65% of all cases [4, 24].
For this task, full delegation of decision making to the machine would be illegal. 18 U.S. Code
§ 3145 gives everyone a right to have the decision of detention reviewed by the court having
jurisdiction over the offense. In Germany, the right to be heard by a competent judge is even
constitutionally protected (Art. 101 GG, BVerfG May 12, 2005, 2 BvR 332/05). Based on such
considerations, the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin ruled that judges looking at COMPAS
scores during sentencing must get warnings about the tool’s performance [67]. Are the procedural
rights of defendants circumvented by giving the judges machine advice? The answer should depend
on (a) the quality of the advice, but also (b) on the way how the judges use the advice. In this
project, we focus on the latter.
Empirical strategy. Ecologically fully valid evidence would require decisions taken by real judges
about real defendants, with and without the benefit of machine advice. Yet even if we could get
data from one jurisdiction where the COMPAS tool is in use, and from another where it is not, this
would not suffice to isolate the effect of machine advice. Legal rules, courts, judges, defendants
and charges would inevitably differ as well. Were we to find a difference, say in the accuracy of
decisions, we would not know whether the difference is indeed driven by the availability of machine
advice. There could also be reverse causality: a jurisdiction may have been more concerned about
accuracy in the first place, and therefore making the tool available. As usual, observational data
would not allow for the identification of causal effects.
Causal evidence requires that otherwise identical decision-makers, faced with identical cases,
are randomly assigned to either receive machine advice or not. In principle, this could be achieved
in one of two ways. One could either administer the same (hypothetical) cases to real judges, or
to lay persons. The former is seemingly appealing as decisions would be taken by individuals
competent to take comparable decisions in the field. Yet for that very reason, the approach would
be problematic. Real judges either have access to computer advice in their daily practice, or they
do not. They have more or less experience with a certain type of case. They would come from
jurisdictions, courts or communities with different normative attitudes towards bailing versus
jailing. Hence we would again face a concern about omitted variables. By contrast when testing
laypersons, we can much more confidently expect idiosyncratic differences to be quasi randomly
distributed across treatments.
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For these reasons we revert to a method that is common in the social sciences. We run a vignette
study. We have a number of crowdworkers each decide on a series of cases. These cases are taken
from Broward County in Florida, where (a) the COMPAS tool is in use and (b) ProPublica, relying
on freedom of information legislation, has found out whether defendants actually have recidivated.
This choice of stimulus material has a number of advantages. The tool is not hypothetical, but
actually used for consequential human decisions. The tool is managed by a commercial provider
that has every interest in improving accuracy. This allows us to put algorithmic decision aids to a
fair test. We increase ecological validity by selecting cases for which we know whether COMPAS
predicts recidivism, and whether the defendant has recidivated in the two years after release. We do
of course not know whether defendants who have been incarcerated would have committed new
crimes when on bail. But for those who have been bailed we also know whether they have been
apprehended again before the original procedure terminates. At least for false negatives, we can
therefore also investigate whether human decision-makers override the machine recommendation
when this would lead to a better choice. We also know whether those who have been incarcerated
have committed a new crime in the two years after their release, which gives us an imperfect proxy
for correct and false positives.
Real judges at least occasionally learn whether they were right when bailing (and, to a lesser
extent, when jailing) the defendant. This in particular holds if cases are not randomly assigned
to judges, and if the same defendant again appears before the same judge. This gives judges an
(imperfect) opportunity for learning. To see whether learning is critical for benefiting from machine
advice, in a second study, after each of the 50 trials, we tell participants whether the defendant
actually recidivated. In this study, we also have treatments where participants first see mostly
reliable vs. mostly unreliable advice, or are initially mostly advised to predict recidivism or not.
Real judges are aware of the fact that the decision to bail the defendant may be consequential
for future victims, and the decision to jail the defendant will be consequential for the defendant.
They may also feel external pressure, for instance from the electorate, if they are up for re-election.
Hence for real judges the stakes are considerably higher. We emulate high stakes by a third study
in which we give participants a (pecuniary) incentive for deciding in line with ground truth. In
further treatments, we capture different normative attitudes towards jailing innocent defendants,
or bailing recidivists, by differential incentives. Finally we incentivize participants for following
the machine’s advice.
For the reasons just explained, giving feedback, and adding incentives, increases ecological
validity. We do, however, readily admit that the way in which we add these elements to the design
of our experiment only emulates feedback and incentives as they occur in the courtroom. Real
judges do not receive feedback for each and every case, and they never receive feedback immediately
after making a decision. Furthermore, real judges normally do not experience immediate financial
consequences of their decision to bail or jail a defendant. This gap between our manipulations and
the decisions in the field that we want to understand is the inevitable price we have to pay for
identifying causal effects.
Contribution. Prior work has chiefly been interested in the fairness of decisions completely
delegated to machines [1, 4, 6, 31] and has extensively studied the distributive [26, 29, 39, 43, 49, 50,
56, 65, 73–75] and procedural [36, 38] fairness of machine decision-making [9, 14, 18, 19, 32, 46], as
well as the feasibility of making fair decisions [14, 19, 32, 46], as reviewed in [9, 18]. Several studies
also explored human perceptions of the fairness of machine decisions, in the context of self-driving
cars [5, 12], targeted-advertising [59], loan approval [62], and bail decisions [36–38, 66].
Another series of studies has compared human andmachine decision-making. Kleinberg et al. [45]
found that algorithms trained on NYC arrest data outperform expert humans judges in predicting
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criminal risk. Dressel and Farid [24] compared the accuracy of groups of human laypersons with
the accuracy of the COMPAS decision aid, and found no significant difference. Tan et al. [68]
studied qualitative differences between human and machine decision-making, again for making
bail decisions. Green and Chen [35] compared the performance of human decision makers with and
without advice, against the machine’s performance, in terms of the accuracy and fairness of the
resulting decisions. An experiment comparing the influence of (alleged) human with "statistical"
advice found that the latter has a substantially smaller effect on people’s choices [52].
There is also a small amount of literature studying the effect of machine advice on human
decisions. Feng and Boyd-Graber [30] investigate how different ways of explaining machine advice,
in a quiz, improve human decisions. Crandall et al. [20] and Dimitrakakis et al. [23] study algorithms
that are able to communicate their strategy to humans, and demonstrate their benefits empirically
[20] and theoretically [23]. Christin [15] studies the use of algorithms in the criminal justice and
web journalism domains, finding that the intended and actual use of algorithms often differ, and
that practitioners often develop strategies for minimizing the impact of algorithmic input in their
daily work. Garrett and Monahan [33] focus on the judicial domain and find pronounced variance
in the way judges use risk assessment tools. Kirchkamp and Strobel [44] investigate whether
sharing decision-making authority with a machine induces human decision makers to become less
responsible, in the sense of being more selfish.
We contribute to this literature by systematically investigating the conditions under which
machine advice improves the accuracy of human decisions. We provide causal evidence, by a series
of experiments. We report three studies. Study 1 uses a within-subjects design. It investigates
whether access to machine advice improves human predictions. We find a small effect, which is
biased in the direction of predicting no recidivism. From a policy perspective, it may be worrisome
that machine advice has little effect, given that deploying the tool is costly. This finding motivates
Studies 2 and 3. In Study 2 we test whether giving human decision makers feedback about the
performance of the machine moderates the effect; it does not. In Study 3, we emulate higher stakes,
by giving participants a financial incentive. It only proves effective if participants gain money by
following the advice.
2 STUDY 1: DOES MACHINE ADVICE IMPROVE ACCURACY?
2.1 Hypotheses
Judges may receive machine advice simply because the legislator (or the court administration)
wants to ease the case load, and get the same job done by fewer judges. Yet from a normative
perspective, one would hope that advice also improves decision quality, and accuracy in particular.
Accuracy is a relevant concern, as judges must make decisions under substantial uncertainty. If
they wrongly bail a defendant who commits a new crime before being adjudicated, the well-being
of the victims is at stake. If judges wrongly jail defendants who would not have reoffended anyway,
they unnecessarily curtail personal freedom, and impose a higher cost on the state.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that systematically investigates the effect
of machine advice on the accuracy of decisions made by humans. Thus we derive our hypotheses
from the social psychology and economics literature on the effect of advice received from a
human advisor on a decision taken by a human decision maker. This literature identifies four
main dimensions which affect the impact of advice: the properties of the advice, advisor, advisee
and the task. Properties of the advice which affect the propensity to take the advice include the
framing [69], the representation [34, 40] and the timing [27, 64] of the advice. Advice taking is also
influenced by traits of the advisor and advisee [11], such as their expertise and confidence, their
prior relationship, the frequency of prior interactions and mutual trust. Finally, the properties of
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the task affect advice taking through the risk [42, 71] and responsibility [7, 8, 21, 44, 71] associated
with the decision making process and outcomes.
If the findings on human advice carry over to machine advice, we expect that machine advice
has an effect on human predictions:
Hypothesis 1 After receiving machine advice, humans change their predictions.
Hypothesis 2 Humans shift their predictions in the direction of the machine’s advice.
The advice taking literature [11] finds that advice is more likely to be followed if the advisor is
confident and accurate. Hence, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3 The less confident the machine was in the advice it gave, the less likely
participants are to follow the advice.
Receiving advice in agreement with one’s pre-advice opinion is found to increase one’s post-
advice confidence [72]. This leads to:
Hypothesis 4When they are in agreement with the advice given by the machine, partici-
pants are more confident.
Criminal procedure presumes innocence. This translates into the standard of proof. Conviction
is only permitted if the jury is convinced "beyond reasonable doubt" that the defendant is guilty
[22]. Strictly speaking, this standard of proof does not apply to bailing decisions. They strike a
balance between protecting potential new victims and the burden inflicted upon the defendant by
incarceration. Still the culturally entrenched presumption might create an asymmetric effect of
machine advice, which leads to
Hypothesis 5 Advice to predict that a defendant will not recidivate has a stronger effect
than advice that he will recidivate.
2.2 Design
Stimulus material.We exploit the fact that we have access to the ProPublica dataset [4], which
contains data about 7214 defendants subjected to the COMPAS tool and tried in Broward County,
Florida, in 2013 and 2014. Using this data, we train a logistic regression classifier to predict whether
a defendant will recidivate within two years. The classifier is implemented using the Python Scikit-
learn package [55]. Comparing predictions with the ground truth retrieved by ProPublica, we learn
that the accuracy of the decision aid we trained is 68% , close to the accuracy of the COMPAS tool
[4, 24].
In our experiments, we randomly select 50 of the 1000 ProPublica cases which were studied by
Dressel and Farid [24].1 For these defendants, we know whether they have recidivated in the two
years after release from prison (if they have been put into jail) or after being put on bail. For the 50
defendants we consider in our experiments, the reconstructed classifier predicts that 18 defendants
to reoffend when put on bail, while police records show that 24 defendants actually reoffended.
75% of the misclassified cases are false negatives: the machine predicted that the defendant will not
commit a new crime within two years, but they did.
Survey Instrument. After completing a consent form, respondents are shown the following text:
Judges in Broward County, Florida use a computer program to help them decide if a
defendant can be released on bail before trial. To help you make bail decisions in this
survey, we will use a similar computer program.
1Focusing on the cases studied by Dressel and Farid [24] makes it possible to compare the performance of our respondents
with the performance of their respondents, on the same set of cases.
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In each question, we will describe a defendant and tell you if the computer program predicts
that this defendant will commit a crime in the next 2 years or not. We will then ask you
to tell us what you believe.
Your answer does not need to match the computer’s prediction, because these predictions
are not always correct. This computer program correctly predicts if a person will commit a
crime in the next 2 years for 68% defendants.
Vignettes. Cases are presented as vignettes [cf. 24], with the following token:
The defendant is a <sex> aged <age>. They have been charged with: <crime>. This crime
is classified as a <misdemeanor / felony>. They have been convicted of <non-juvenile prior
count> prior crimes. They have <juvenile felony prior count> juvenile felony charges and
<juvenile misdemeanor prior count> juvenile misdemeanor charges on their record.
The vignettes are shown in random order, to mitigate the effects of order bias [61]. After reading
a vignette, participants are asked whether they believe the defendant will commit another crime
in the next 2 years or not. They are also asked how confident they are about their answer.2 After
answering these questions, participants receive the following information:
A computer program similar to the one used by judges in Broward County, Florida,
estimates that this defendant <will / will not> commit a crime in the next 2 years. This
computer program correctly predicts if a person will commit a crime in the next 2 years
for 68% of defendants.
Participants are able to observe their previous answer, and are asked to make a new prediction,
and to report their confidence in their new prediction.
Design choices. Two design choices warrant explanation. Real judges are not making predictions;
they decide whether to put the defendant on bail. However, the law wants this decision to be based
on the risk of recidivism, and the machine advice exclusively covers this risk. We test laypersons,
who are likely to vary in their attitudes towards crime, and incapacitation in particular. We do not
know these attitudes. To overcome this potential confound and directly ask respondents to predict
recidivism risk.
COMPAS produces a "risk score", on a scale from 0 to 10. We use the risk scores to assess COMPAS
/ machine confidence (i.e., inverse of the difficulty) in giving advice for defendants on a scale of 0
to 4. Specifically, we map defendants with extreme risk scores of 0 and 10 to the highest confidence
(least difficulty) score of 0, and map the defendants with a middle risk score of 5 to the lowest
confidence (highest difficulty) score of 4.
However, COMPAS does not reveal how it calculates the risk score. It is therefore not clear
what exactly the predicted risk score represents. We replace it with the reconstructed classifier,
which we know to predict precisely what we ask our participants to predict, namely the risk that
defendant recidivates within two years. Given this classifier is trained on the ground truth data
that ProPublica has retrieved, we are also able to exactly measure its accuracy rate. This is how we
measured the accuracy rate of 68%, which we reported to the participants in the stimulus material.
Hence with this design choice, we test machine advice as it truly performs in the field.
Conduct. We run the experiment on Prolific – an online crowdworking platform, similar to
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Unlike MTurk, Prolific was explicitly designed for online
subject recruitment for the scientific community [53]. Prolific’s advanced pre-screening capabilities
allow us to select participants from the United States that have self-reported to have served on
a jury. For study 1, we randomly recruit 103 participants from this pool of participants in their
2For the exact wording and layout of these questions, please see the screenshots in the appendix.
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Demographic Attribute Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Census
Total respondents 108 112 108 -
Passed attention checks 103 100 100 -
Male 49% 55% 56% 49%
African American 5% 11% 14% 13%
Asian 6% 4% 6% 6%
Caucasian 82% 68% 68% 61%
Hispanic 6% 12% 6% 18%
Other 1% 5% 6% 4%
Bachelor’s Degree or above 60% 58% 58% 30%
Liberal 54% 50% 47% 33%†
Conservative 26% 17% 16% 29%†
Moderate 17% 29% 29% 34%†
Other 3% 4% 8% 4%†
Jury Duty Experience 74% 79% 72% 27%‡
Table 1. Demographics of our survey samples, compared to the 2016 U.S. Census [70]. Attributes marked
with a † were compared to Pew data [58] for political leaning. Attributes marked with a ‡ were compared to
DRI 2012 National Poll data [25]. We also report the total number of respondents who participated in our
studies, as well as the number of respondents who successfully answered both attention check questions. The
reported demographics concern the respondents who passed the attention checks.
Prolific user profiles. For each of the five treatments reported in study 2, and for each of the five
treatments reported in study 3, we have 20 participants, selected in the same way.
After taking part in the experiment, participants answer a set of questions about their demo-
graphics. Their answers are shown in Table 1. Our 3 samples consists of more Caucasians than
the U.S. population (82%, 68% and 68%, compared to 61%). Our participants are also more highly
educated, with close to 60% holding at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 30% in the 2016 U.S.
Census. Also, our participants are more liberal leaning (54%, 50% and 47% compared to 33%). The
skews in education and ethnicity are consistent with the findings from prior studies on crowd-
working platform demographics [41, 54, 57]. Even though we targeted only participants that have
self-reported that they have served on a jury in their Prolific profiles, only 74% (study 1), 79% (study
2) and 72% (study 3) of them reported that this is the case in our demographic survey.
In Study 1, participants receive £2 for their participation, but are not incentivized for the pre-
dictions they make. The experiment takes approximately 25 minutes. In order to make sure that
participants take the task seriously, they have to answer 2 attention check questions. We discard the
answers of all of the respondents who did not successfully answer both attention check questions.
The design of the experiment has been approved by our institution’s Ethical Review Board.
2.3 Results
Figure 1 summarizes predictions made in Study 1. While for certain defendants only very few
participants predict that the defendant will commit a new crime, in other cases all of the participants
predict recidivism, and decisions in the intermediate cases are well balanced. Descriptively, machine
advice does not have a strong effect. For most cases, the fraction of participants who predict
recidivism is very similar with and without advice. There are exceptions though, in particular for
cases that are closer to the endpoints of the distribution.
Our participants achieved an accuracy of 60.2%, which is close to the accuracy of 62.1%, reported
by [24] in the same setting. Our respondents are less accurate when responding without observing
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Fig. 1. Predictions Made With and Without Machine Advice. Cases ordered by fraction of participants who
predict that the defendant will recidivate when not having machine advice (blue line). Fraction of participants
who predict recidivism upon receiving advice superimposed (red line). [Left] Y-axis: fraction of participants
who predict recidivism. [Right] Y-axis: fraction of participants who make a prediction which corresponds to
the machine’s advice.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
recidivism prediction .593*** (.012) .475*** (.021) .684*** (.028)
ground truth -.019 (.014) -.059*** (.014)
recidivism prediction * ground truth .167*** (.027) .179*** (.027)
difficulty .072*** (.005)
recidivism prediction * difficulty -.121*** (.009)
cons .268*** (.012) .275*** (.013) .176*** (.014)
Table 2. Effect of advice, ground truth and COMPAS confidence. dv: dummy that is 1 if participant predicts
that defendant will recidivate; recidivism prediction: dummy that is 1 if machine predicts recidivism; ground
truth: dummy that is 1 if defendant recidivates; difficulty (to give advice) on a scale from 0 .. 4. Linear
probability model with participant random effect. Number of observations, cases, participants are 5150, 50,
and 103 respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1
advice (60.2%), than they are with advice (61.6%), and in both cases they are less accurate than the
decision aid (68%), which is also consistent with the findings of [35].
Upon receiving advice, in 390 of 5150 cases the participants change their prediction. For statistical
analysis, we take into account the fact that each participant makes 50 predictions. This is why we
estimate a model with a random effect for participants. We estimate linear probability models, as
coefficients can then be directly interpreted, and as we keep the ability to add interaction terms [2].
For testing Hypothesis 1 we estimate a constant only model, and use a dummy as the dependent
variable that is 1 if the participant has changed her prediction upon receiving machine advice. This
regression estimates that, in the population, 7.6% will change their decision in the light of machine
advice (p < .001).3 This gives us
Result 1: In a minority of cases, participants react to machine advice by changing whether they
predict recidivism.
3The result stays the same if we additionally add a random effect for cases to the statistical model, to capture potential
dependence across participants that originates in the fact that cases trigger systematically different responses.
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Machine
Respondent pre-advice post-advice
recidivism no recidivism recidivism no recidivism
recidivism 1339 309 1419 229
no recidivism 1149 2353 939 2563
Table 3. Contingency tables, describing the relationship between machine advice and the respondents’
pre-advice and post advice-decisions. Number of observations, cases, participants are 5150, 50, and 103
respectively.
The fact that machine advice has little influence might, at least partly, be due to the fact that we
make the relatively low accuracy of the advice explicit. Participants might read this as a hint not to
take the advice seriously. However, the accuracy rate of only 68% closely matches the accuracy of
the COMPAS tool [4, 24], and in a recent decision the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has mandated
that such information be given to judges if they receive advice from the COMPAS tool (Wisconsin
Supreme Court 2016 WI 68). We are thus testing the effect that the advice is likely to have in the
field.
As noted, our respondents change their prediction for 390 out of the 5150 cases. However, our
respondents had a high rate of agreement with the machine advice to start with. The agreement
rates differ amongst respondents, and are detailed in Figure 1 [Right]. Namely, before observing
machine advice, 3692 out of the 5150 responses (71.7%) concur with the advice, while 1458 differ.
After observing machine advice, 3982 out of the 5150 responses (77.3%) concur with the advice. In
other words, observing advice resolves 290 out of the 1458 pre-advice disagreements (19.9%). The
detailed contingency tables can be found in Table 3.
In 340 of the 390 cases in which participants change their prediction after receiving machine
advice, they follow the advice, while they chose the opposite of the advice in 50 cases. We test
individual average switches of these 103 participants against the equal split, and find that they are
more likely to follow the advice (signrank test, p < .001). We thus have support for Hypothesis 2,
which gives us
Result 2: Participants are more likely to change their prediction in the direction of the received
machine advice.
As we predicted in Hypothesis 3, participants are indeed able to infer the quality of the machine
advice from the information about the offence and the defendant. We focus on Model 3 of Table 2 as
this turns out to be most informative.4 If the machine predicts that the defendant will not recidivate,
the machine is perfectly confident, and the defendant has actually not recidivated according to the
ground truth data, 17.6% of the participants nonetheless predict that the defendant will recidivate
(constant). If the machine is one out of five steps less confident in its advice, 24.8% predict recidivism
(main effect of difficulty). Interestingly, if the machine has predicted no recidivism, and has been
perfectly confident, but the defendant has actually recidivated according to the ground truth
data, participants are only 11.7% likely to predict recidivism (main effect of ground truth). Yet
if the available information suggests that the machine might be less confident by one step, the
counterintuitive effect is already neutralized, and participants are 18.9% likely to predict recidivism
(main effect of ground truth and difficulty).
Upon receiving advice, in 130 cases participants shift towards predicting recidivism, and in 260
cases they shift towards predicting no recidivism. As predicted by Hypothesis 5, the advice that
the defendant will not recidivate has a stronger effect than the advice that he will recidivate. The
4The effects of ground truth, and its interaction with advice to jail, are insignificant if we add a case random effect to the
specification. All other effects remain significant, with p < .015.
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Model 1 Model 2
shift 1.068*** (.066) .326*** (.060)
advice to predict recidivism .564*** (.033)
shift * advice to predict recidivism -2.440*** (.134)
agreement 1.005*** (.034)
shift * agreement -.285+ (.163)
cons 5.233*** (.062) 4.639*** (.067)
Table 4. Effect of Machine Advice on Confidence. dv: confidence, on a scale from 1 to 7, in prediction, after
seeing machine advice; shift: participant changes prediction upon receiving machine advice (-1 = shift towards
predicting no recidivism, 1 = shift towards predicting recidivism, 0 = no change) ; advice to predict recidivism:
dummy that is 1 if machine predicts recidivism; agreement: participant’s pre-advice prediction concurs with
machine advice. Linear probability models with participant random effect. Number of observations, cases,
participants are 5150, 50, and 103 respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05,
+ p < .1
probability that a participant shifts towards predicting no recidivism upon receiving the advice to
do so is 8.45%. By contrast the probability that a participant shifts towards predicting recidivism
upon receiving the advice to do is only 5.7%. This difference is significantly different from zero.5
We conclude
Result 3: Participants are more likely to change their decision upon receiving machine advice if the
machine predicts that defendant will not recidivate.
We further test the effects of ground truth and machine confidence on participants’ decisions.
Even though the participants do not observe this information, it seems that they are able to infer it.
If the machine advises to predict recidivism and is perfectly confident, but this is at odds with the
ground truth, participants are nonetheless 86% likely to predict that the defendant will recidivate
(main effect of advice to predict recidivism). Yet if the machine is 1 out of 5 steps less confident,
this probability is reduced to 81.1% (main effects of advice and of difficulty and their interaction).
If participants are advised to predict recidivism, and the machine is perfectly confident, and this
advice is in line with the ground truth, participants are 98% likely to follow this advice (main effects
of advice and ground truth and their interaction). The lower the machine’s confidence, the more
this probability is reduced (by 4.9% for each degree of uncertainty, main effect of difficulty and
interaction). We conclude
Result 4: Participants’ decisions are affected by ground truth and machine confidence. The more
difficult a case is for COMPAS to decide, the more participants are likely to deviate from the advice.
As the regressions of Table 4 show, participants are pretty confident overall.6 If the machine
advises to predict that a defendant will not recidivate and this is also the participant’s prediction,
participants indicate a confidence level of 5.233, on a scale from 1 to 7. Their confidence reduces
by 1.068 points if they initially predicted recidivism. If they follow the machine advice and shift
towards predicting recidivism, their confidence is reduced by .808 (main effect of advice to predict
recidivism and interaction). Model 2 further analyses the effect of receiving advice which concurs
or does not concur with the respondents’ pre-advice prediction on their reported post-advice
confidence. If the advice is in line with their original prediction, this makes them more confident.
These regressions support Hypothesis 4, which gives us
5In a statistical model with a participant random effect, p < .001; if we further add a random effect for cases, p = .089.
6For a graphical representation, see the Appendix.
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Result 5: If respondents receive advice which concurs with their pre-advice prediction, they become
more confident, while receiving opposing advice leads to a decrease in confidence.
3 STUDY 2: IS MACHINE ADVICE MORE EFFECTIVE WITH FEEDBACK?
3.1 Motivation and Hypotheses
For a trial judge, the decision whether to set a defendant free on bail is a routine decision. In the
jurisdictions that give the judge access to machine advice, judges thus repeatedly receive advice
from the same source. They do not get feedback in each and every case. But it is not unlikely
that a judge over time learns whether a defendant has reoffended, for instance as the judge has
to decide about now incarcerating him. In some jurisdictions, case assignment is stable over time,
and for instance tied to the defendant’s name, or to his residence. That gives the judge additional
opportunities for learning whether her prediction had been correct. Through such feedback, the
judge may over time gain a better sense of the reliability of the COMPAS tool, both in general, and
for specific types of cases or defendants. These considerations straightforwardly translate into
Hypothesis 6 If recipients receive feedback about the accuracy of machine advice, they are
more likely to rely on the advice.
Now as we have repeatedly stressed, our decision aid is only mildly reliable, with average
accuracy of 68%, close to the accuracy of the COMPAS tool [4, 24]. The perceived quality of the
advice will therefore depend on the sequence of cases that the individual judge had to decide.
Arguably if its predictions have mostly been correct in the beginning of the sequence, the judge
will be more likely to trust the advice than if she has initially received feedback that mainly ran
counter to the machine advice. This gives us
Hypothesis 7 If recipients initially mostly receive feedback in line with the machine advice,
they are more likely to rely on the advice. If they initially mostly receive feedback in
opposition to the machine advice, they are less likely to rely on the advice.
In Study 1, we found support for Hypothesis 5: respondents are more likely to follow the advice
if the machine predicts that the defendant will not recidivate. Now this finding might be due to
the specific parameters of Study 1. We had only 18/50 cases in which our tool predicts recidivism.
To test whether the finding is robust, we did not want to change the set of cases. That would
have made the results vulnerable to confounds, as not only the frequency of the recommendation
to predict recidivism would change, but also the case characteristics. We avoid the confound by
merely changing the order in which participants see the cases. This is analogous to a court that
is predominantly presented with defendants with a long criminal history, or with particularly
egregious charges. Both may happen if case selection is not random. This yields
Hypothesis 8 If recipients initially mostly learn that defendants have recidivated, they are
more likely to predict recidivism. If they initially mostly learn that defendants have not
recidivated, they are less likely to predict recidivism.
3.2 Design
Study 2 builds on the design of Study 1. It complements the within subjects design of Study 1 with
a between subjects design. For testing Hypothesis 6, Study 1 is the baseline. We add the feedback
treatment in which, after having recorded their final prediction, participants learn the ground truth.
This is of course more and better feedback than a real judge would ever see. Real judges at best
learn for a few select cases whether the defendant recidivated. They are more likely to get feedback
if they have released the defendant, in particular if the prosecution presents the defendant again
after having apprehended him for a new crime. Feedback will never be immediate. For all these
reasons, with this comparison we estimate only an upper bound on learning.
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Fig. 2. Effect of receiving feedback. Comparing patterns of post advice predictions between the baseline
(without feedback) and the feedback treatment. X-axis shows defendants, sorted by participants’ propensity
to predict that they will recidivate (in the baseline). Y-axis: fraction predicting recidivism.
In the feedback treatment, participants see the 50 cases in the same sequence as in the baseline. In
the good advice treatment, participants initially see mostly cases in which the machine advice is in
line with ground truth. In the bad advice treatment, participants initially see mostly cases in which
the machine advice is in opposition to ground truth. The precise sequences are reported in the
appendix. We intersperse a few cases with incorrect advice in the former, and with correct advice
in the latter treatment. Otherwise the sequence would have seemed utterly unrealistic. Also, the
participants would have noticed the pattern too easily. In both treatments, we inform participants
about the ground truth after every case. This is why we compare these treatments to the feedback
treatment (with random order).
By the same token, in the bail advice treatment, participants initially see mostly cases in which
our tool advises to not predict recidivism. In the jail advice treatment, participants initially see
mostly cases in which our tool advises to predict recidivism. Participants are again informed about
ground truth after every case.
In Study 2, participants receive £2.5 for their participation. Due to receiving feedback, this
experiment took slightly longer than the one in study 1 – approximately 30 minutes. We ran
Study 2 on the same online platform as Study 1, and participants were randomly selected from the
same subject pool. Participants only participated in one treatment. For each treatment we had 20
participants. The demographics of the participants are shown in Table 1.
3.3 Results
Figure 2 shows that giving participants feedback has no discernible effect. A fresh group of partici-
pants, upon receiving machine advice, essentially makes the same predictions as their predecessors
in the baseline. We also do not find a significant effect of the feedback treatment on participants’
propensity to change their prediction upon receiving advice.7 We thus have no support for Hy-
pothesis 6. This is remarkable. As explained, the learning opportunity is much more powerful than
it could ever be in the field. It is also reassuring that fresh participants judge individual cases in
very similar ways.
Figure 3 shows that the propensity to predict that defendant will recidivate is also not influenced
by the sequence in which participants see the cases. Neither initially mostly seeing correct, or
mostly incorrect evidence matter (left panel), nor does initially seeing mostly cases where our tool
7The regression is available from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 3. Effect of varying the order in which the advice is shown. X-axis shows defendants, sorted by participants’
post-advice propensity to predict recidivism, in the treatment where the questions are shown in random
order. Y-axis: fraction of participants who predict recidivism, after receiving machine advice.
predicts recidivism, or no recidivism (right panel). We also do not find any significant effects of the
good advice, bad advice, bail advice or jail advice treatments on participants’ propensity to change
their prediction upon receiving advice. This also holds if we separate effects by the first 20 trials
(where the cases are sorted in the direction of the treatment) and the remaining 30 trials (where
they are sorted in the opposite direction).8 Hence we also do not have any support for Hypotheses
7 and 8. Feedback is not critical for the effect of machine advice. Human agents do not have to
learn (when) to trust machine advice.
4 STUDY 3: IS MACHINE ADVICE MORE EFFECTIVE WHEN STAKES ARE HIGHER?
4.1 Motivation and Hypotheses
Arguably, policymakers do not only equip judges with machine advice in order to economize on
judicial labour. The political intention is not confined to increasing judicial efficiency. Deploying
machine advice would be normatively appealing if it (also) increases accuracy. This would help
protect victims and defendants alike. From this perspective, two findings from Study 1 may be
troublesome: (a) the effect of machine advice is small: most of the time participants stick to the choice
they have made before receiving the advice. (b) The effect of machine advice is biased: participants
are more likely to follow the advice if the machine recommends to predict that defendant will not
recidivate.
Hopefully, judges are predominantly motivated intrinsically. They are aware of the fact that
they exercise sovereign powers, in ways that can be very consequential for people’s lives. That this
expectation is not unfounded can even be shown experimentally [28]. Yet a substantial literature
shows that judges are not immune to incentives. Many judges in particular care about advancing
their careers [63], and make decisions that they expect to improve their chances for promotion
[16] or reelection [13]. Judges have also been shown to be sensitive to more subtle incentives.
They care for prestige [17] and reputation [51]. Judges also tend to be averse to their decisions
being overturned on appeal [60], and they are wary about the risk that legislators might curtail the
judiciary’s budget [3].
For obvious reasons, we cannot manipulate any of these incentives in our experiment. But there
is a straightforward way of making predictions more consequential for participants: we can give
them financial incentives. In the field, incentives are of course more subtle. As with feedback,
8These regressions are available from the authors upon request.
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Correct Incorrect
False Positive False Negative
Aligned Not Aligned Aligned Not Aligned Aligned Not Aligned
Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ground Truth .2 .2 -.2 -.2 -.2 -.2
False Positive .2 .2 -.5 -.5 -.1 -.1
False Negative .2 .2 -.1 -.1 -.5 -.5
Weak Alignment .1 .5 .1 -.2 .1 -.2
Strong Alignment .1 .2 .1 -.5 .1 -.5
Table 5. Treatments in Study 3. The values indicate the size of the monetary incentives used, in £.
with our manipulation we test the upper bound. If even a financial incentive that is immediate –
and directly tied to the prediction made in the concrete case – is not effective, a fortiori the more
subtle incentives that policymakers might use as levers will also be ineffective. In Study 3, we thus
investigate whether machine advice can be made more effective by increasing stakes.
We ultimately want to learn whether exogenous interventions moderate the effect of machine
advice on the predictions participants make. Yet what looks like moderation could effectively be an
effect of incentives on predictions, even if they are made without the benefit of machine advice.
We therefore begin by testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9 If participants are incentivized to avoid wrongful detention, they are less
likely to predict that defendant will recidivate, even before having access to machine advice.
Conversely, if they are incentivized to avoid that defendant commits new crime before being
tried, they are more likely to predict that he will recidivate, even before having access to
machine advice.
Our main interest is, however, in the effect of incentives on the sensitivity towards machine
advice, which we expect to work as follows:
Hypothesis 10 a If participants are incentivized to match ground truth, they are more
likely to follow machine advice.
b If participants are incentivized to avoid wrongful detention, they are more likely to follow
the advice of the machine to predict that the defendant will not recidivate.
c If participants are incentivized to avoid that the defendant commits a new crime before
being tried, they are more likely to follow the advice of the machine to predict recidivism.
d If participants are incentivized to follow the machine’s advice, they will be more likely to
do so, and the stronger the incentive the more they will follow it.
4.2 Design
Study 3 uses the exact same design as Study 1, except that choices are incentivized. Thus, as in
Study 2, we complement the within subjects design of Study 1 with a between subjects design.
In this between subjects comparison, we treat Study 1 as the baseline. Respondents earn a base
payment of £2 for completing the survey. At the beginning of the survey, participants are informed
that they can earn an additional monetary reward, based on their performance. Table 5 summarizes
our manipulations.
In the ground truth treatment, for each case participants gain an extra £.2 if their choice is in
line with ground truth, i.e. if they predict no recidivism if the defendant did not recidivate, and
recidivism if he did. They lose £.2 if they get it wrong. If the bonus earned after answering all 50
questions is negative, no money is deducted from the base earnings of £2.
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Fig. 4. Effect of Incentives on Predictions pre Advice. Cases ordered by fraction of participants who predict
recidivism when not having machine advice and with no incentives (blue line). Fraction of participants who
predict recidivism when choice is incentivized superimposed (different colors). Y-axis: fraction of participants
who predict recidivism.
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Fig. 5. Predictions Made Without and With Machine Advice with Incentive for Ground Truth. Cases ordered
by fraction of participants who predict that defendant recidivates when not having machine advice (blue
line). Fraction of participants who predict revidivism upon receiving advice superimposed (red line). Y-axis:
fraction of participants who predict recidivism.
In the false positive and false negative treatments, predictions in line with ground truth also
give them an extra £.2. But now different mistakes are incentivized differently. In the false positive
treatment, £.5 are subtracted from their bonus if they predict recidivism although the defendant
would not have recidivated. In contrast, predicting that a defendant will not recidivate who actually
has only costs them £.1. In the false negative treatment, incentives are swapped, and predicting no
recidivism if defendant actually recidivated costs participants £.5, while predicting that a defendant
will recidivate who actually has not only costs them £.1.
In the final two treatments, participants always earn an extra £.1 if their prediction is in line
with machine advice, irrespective of ground truth. Deviating from machine advice is incentivized
two different ways. In the weak alignment treatment, participants earn a premium of £.5 when
deviating from the advice and they are right (in line with ground truth). If they deviate and are
wrong, they lose £.2 (irrespective of whether this is a false positive or a false negative). By contrast
in the strong alignment treatment, correctly deviating from the advice only gives them an extra £.2,
while incorrectly deviating costs them £.5.
We ran Study 3 on the same online platform as Study 1 and Study 2. Participants were randomly
selected from the same subject pool. Participants only participated in one treatment. For each
treatment we had 20 participants. The demographics of the participants are shown in Table 1.
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Fig. 6. Predictions Made Without and With Machine Advice with Incentive to Avoid False Positives or False
Negatives. Cases ordered by fraction of participants who predict recidivism when not having machine advice
(blue line). Fraction of participants who predict recidivism upon receiving advice superimposed (red line).
4.3 Results
The plots of Figure 4 compare the choices the participants have made without the benefit of advice,
either with or without incentives. The left panel shows that unbiased incentives have virtually no
effect. Participants want to get it right anyways. The incentive has an effect, though, if participants
lose money when predicting that a defendant recidivates who actually would not. The middle panel
of Figure 4 and a linear regression with participant random effect, explaining prediction before
advice with treatment, where the baseline from Study 1 is the reference category, show that the
prediction that defendant will recidivate is 6.8% less likely in the false positive treatment, p = .0309).
There is an effect in the opposite direction in the false negative treatment, where the prediction that
defendant will recidivate is 10.9% more likely (p = .001). Descriptively, whether or not the incentive
to align with the advice is weak or strong, participants are somewhat more likely to predict that
defendant will not recidivate (right panel of Figure 4). Yet these effects are far from significance (p
= .252 and 239, respectively). We thus have support for Hypothesis 9 and conclude
Result 6: If participants are incentivized to avoid false positive predictions, they are less likely to
predict recidivism. If they are incentivized to avoid false negative predictions, they are more likely to
predict recidivism.
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 1 suggests that participants’ sensitivity to advice does not
change if they are incentivized for finding the ground truth. This is indeed what we find in the
regression of Table 6.10 This runs counter to Hypothesis 10a.
The two panels of Figure 6 show that the incentive to avoid false positive or false negative choices
does not induce participants to rely more on machine advice, counter to our Hypotheses 10 b and
10 c.
On the other hand, incentives to align with machine advice have the effect predicted by Hypoth-
esis 10 d, as shown in Figure 7 and Table 6.11 However, the effect is not more pronounced if the
incentive is stronger (Wald test comparing the two treatment effects, p = .495). We thus have partial
support for Hypothesis 10 d and conclude
Result 7: If participants have a (weak or strong) incentive to align with machine advice, they are
more likely to change their decision after receiving the advice.
9Coefficient and p-value stay the same when adding a case random effect to the specification.
10All coefficients and all p-values stay the same if we add a case random effect to the specification.
11All significant effects in Table 6 remain significant if we add a case random effect to the specification.
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ground truth -.002 (.019)
false positive -.016 (.019)
false negative .010 (.019)
weak alignment .062*** (.019)
strong alignment .079*** (.019)
cons .076*** (.008)
Table 6. Effect of Treatment on Sensitivity Towards Advice. dv: dummy that is 1 if participant changes predic-
tion after learning advice. Linear probability model with participant random effect. Number of observations,
cases, participants are 10150, 50, and 203 respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, *
p < .05, + p < .1
no incentive ground truth false positive false negative weak align. strong align.
ACC 61.6% 59.6% 61.1% 58.4% 61.3% 64.5%
FPR .348 .403 .302 .490 .385 .296
FNR .423 .404 .483 .335 .389 .418
Table 7. Effect of Treatments on Participants’ Performance in Terms of Accuracy (ACC), False Positive rate
(FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR).
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Fig. 7. Choices Made Without and With Machine Advice with Incentive to Align with Advice. Cases ordered
by fraction of participants who predict recidivism when not having machine advice (blue line). Fraction of
participants who predict recidivism upon receiving advice superimposed (red line).
Table 7 summarizes the effects of different incentive schemes on participants’ performance.
Incentivizing participants to match the ground truth or to avoid false positive or false negative
mistakes does not lead to an increase in accuracy. Yet the intervention leads to a different distribution
of mistakes – lower false positive rates for the former (from .348 to .302) and lower false negative
rates for the latter (from .423 to .335). Strong alignment incentives lead to an increase in accuracy
(from 61.6% to 64.5%), with most of this increase in performance visible in lower false positive rates
(from .348 to .296).
5 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The more consequential a decision, the less acceptable it is to delegate it to a machine, even if the
machine has been trained on a rich dataset, and has been shown to have good accuracy, maybe
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 178. Publication date: November 2019.
178:18 Nina Grgić-Hlača et al.
even higher accuracy than human decision makers entrusted with the same decision. One such
decision is the choice between sending a suspect to jail, versus releasing him on bail. In most legal
orders, making this choice is the prerogative of the competent judge. Yet arguably the accuracy
of judicial decision making can be improved by giving the judge access to a machine’s prediction
of the risk that the defendant will recidivate before being tried, if let out on bail. This is not a
contrived example; multiple US States give judges access to precisely this prediction, based on the
commercial product COMPAS, sold by Northpointe.
We construct vignettes from 50 randomly selected cases from the COMPAS dataset. For all cases
we know ground truth. In Study 1, we test laypersons on these vignettes, both without and with
the benefit of advice. Advice has a significant, but fairly small effect. Yet this effect is asymmetric:
participants are more likely to follow the advice if the machine predicts that the defendant will not
recidivate, and hence proposes to put the defendant on bail. In two supplementary experiments
we test whether the impact of machine advice can be increased, and whether it can be debiased.
Giving participants feedback about ground truth does not prove effective. A financial incentive
(meant to emulate higher stakes) only matters if it is tied to following the advice, not if it is tied to
the quality of the advice, or to its direction. Using this approach, we are the first to provide causal
evidence about the effect of machine advice on the accuracy of human decision making, in the
judicial domain.
The main limitation of the study is the subject pool. For obvious ethical reasons, we could not
study how real judges decide real cases. It would also have been problematic to test real judges on
hypothetical cases, as we could not control for the varied experiences of the different judges. This
is why we turn to laypersons who are randomly drawn from the general population. Yet we have
made sure that participants are eligible for jury duty, and that most of them have actually served
as jury members. They thus have experienced the judicial system from within. We further note
that our participants exhibited a prediction accuracy comparable to the one reported in prior work,
and that their reported confidence varied across cases. Both suggest that they have taken the task
seriously, despite the fact that we could only ask how they would decide, were they to be given
authority.
Machine advice is not confined to bailing defendants. Other illustrations include decisions
about loans, social security benefits, or hiring applicants. Although it is not normally thought
of as machine advice, targeted advertising can also be brought under this rubric. It would be an
interesting topic for future work to compare machine advice in such domains with its effect in the
judicial domain.
In our study, we have varied the properties of the task, by giving differential feedback, and by
changing the monetary rewards and penalties associated with making certain types of decisions.
We have made no changes to the decision aid nor to the advice it provided. In future work, we
plan to study the effects of varying the properties of the decision aid and of the advice as well. The
advice taking literature points us towards properties which seem worth studying. The advice might
be differently timed or framed. Additional information, for instance about the performance of the
decision aid in specific classes of cases, its confidence in its decisions, or explanations about how it
derived the advice, might influence the degree of trust. The degree of trust might also depend on
how the advisee has learned this information about the performance of the tool – by having access
to statistical evaluations they find differently easy to interpret, or through personal experience.
It would also be interesting to bring alternative incentives for accuracy, or for being sensitive to
machine advice, to the lab. Another dimension worth studying is the type of information about
accuracy which is provided. One might for instance study whether machine advice is processed
differently when it comes with accuracy rates per type of crime, or per defendant characteristics
(like gender or race). Finally, building up on prior work which found that statistical advice has
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 178. Publication date: November 2019.
Human Decision Making with Machine Assistance: An Experiment on Bailing and Jailing 178:19
a smaller effect than human advice, it would be interesting to look into the root causes of this
discrepancy.
Machine advice has to be properly engineered. We see our experiment as a first step towards de-
signing powerful interfaces between advice-giving machines and advice-receiving human decision
makers.
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A APPENDIX
Fig. 8. Screenshot of the survey used in Study 2 to elicit respondents’ [Top] pre-advice predictions and
confidence, [Center] post-advice predictions and confidence, and [Bottom] provide them with feedback. In
Study 1, the feedback shown in [Bottom] was not provided. In Study 3, participants were also informed about
their bonus payment.
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Case
ID












222 F 43 Driving Under the Influence M 0 0 0 0 0
763 M 26 Assault with a Deadly Weapon F 7 0 0 1 1
1385 M 28 Battery M 4 0 0 1 1
1490 M 30 Battery M 4 0 0 1 1
1870 M 20 Carrying a Concealed Weapon F 0 0 0 0 1
2078 M 43 Burglary F 4 0 0 1 0
2278 M 63 Battery M 0 0 0 1 0
2438 M 67 Battery M 0 0 0 0 0
2502 M 45 Grand Theft F 0 0 0 0 0
2533 M 19 Battery M 0 0 0 1 0
2632 M 56 Possession of Cocaine F 4 0 0 0 0
2898 F 31 Battery M 0 0 0 0 0
2914 M 29 False Imprisonment F 1 0 0 0 0
3146 M 37 Tampering with a Witness F 0 0 0 1 0
3229 M 26 Driving Under the Influence F 2 0 0 0 0
3255 M 51 Driving with a Suspended License M 4 0 0 0 0
3347 F 36 Criminal Damage of less than $1000 F 7 0 0 1 1
3552 M 28 Battery M 0 0 0 0 0
3679 F 47 Prostitution M 0 0 0 1 0
3805 M 28 Grand Theft F 0 0 0 1 0
4029 M 28 Battery M 0 0 0 1 0
4553 M 34 Operating a Vehicle without a Valid
Drivers License
M 2 0 0 0 0
4593 M 38 Battery M 0 0 0 0 0
5057 F 49 Driving with a Suspended License F 1 0 0 0 0
5069 M 24 Prostitution M 2 1 0 1 1
5128 M 39 Battery M 1 0 0 0 0
5217 M 37 Battery F 0 0 0 1 0
5449 M 32 Burglary F 1 0 0 0 0
5543 M 45 Battery M 3 0 0 1 0
5921 M 52 Restraining Order Violation M 4 0 0 1 0
6000 F 23 Burglary F 0 0 0 1 1
6094 M 30 Dealing Controlled Substances F 7 0 0 1 1
6207 M 38 Extradition of Defendants M 0 0 0 1 0
6658 M 39 Forgery F 0 0 0 1 0
6908 M 30 Driving with a Revoked License F 21 0 0 1 1
7012 M 28 Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana F 0 0 0 0 0
7894 M 20 Burglary F 0 0 0 0 0
7975 M 23 Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana F 11 8 2 1 1
8149 M 27 Domestic Violence M 3 0 0 0 1
8438 F 34 Possession of Cocaine F 12 0 0 1 1
9041 M 36 Driving Under the Influence M 0 0 0 0 0
9231 M 35 Possession of Cocaine F 3 0 0 0 1
9303 M 30 Driving with a Suspended License M 0 0 0 0 0
9556 M 30 Assault with a Deadly Weapon F 1 0 0 0 0
9953 M 23 Grand Theft F 1 0 0 1 1
10406 M 43 Possession of Cocaine F 2 0 0 0 0
10580 F 22 Domestic Violence M 1 0 0 0 1
10762 F 26 Driving Under the Influence M 1 0 0 0 0
10807 M 25 Driving with a Suspended License M 3 0 0 1 1
10946 M 27 Driving Under the Influence M 1 0 0 0 0
Table 8. Vignettes used as stimulus material in our experiments.
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 3, No. CSCW, Article 178. Publication date: November 2019.
178:24 Nina Grgić-Hlača et al.
good advice bad advice bail advice jail advice
222 4593 10946 2078
2533 1870 9231 763
8438 5217 10762 1385
10946 5543 9556 1870
10807 9231 5921 1490
10762 2438 9303 222
10406 1385 9041 2278
9953 3679 7894 3347
2278 1490 10580 2533
9556 5921 7012 5069
9303 6207 6207 6000
7975 10580 3255 6094
9041 2502 10406 3679
7894 2078 5543 6908
4029 3146 9953 7975
6908 6094 5449 6658
3805 2898 10807 2632
7012 6658 5217 8149
6000 2914 5128 2898
5449 8149 5057 8438
5128 3229 2438 2914
2632 763 4029 3146
5069 3255 4593 2502
5057 3347 4553 3229
4553 3552 3805 3552
3552 4553 3552 3805
3347 5057 3229 4553
3255 5069 2502 4593
763 2632 3146 4029
3229 5128 2914 2438
8149 5449 8438 5057
2914 6000 2898 5128
6658 7012 8149 5217
2898 3805 2632 10807
6094 6908 6658 5449
3146 4029 7975 9953
2078 7894 6908 5543
2502 9041 3679 10406
10580 7975 6094 3255
6207 9303 6000 6207
5921 9556 5069 7012
1490 2278 2533 10580
3679 9953 3347 7894
1385 10406 2278 9041
2438 10762 222 9303
9231 10807 1490 5921
5543 10946 1870 9556
5217 8438 1385 10762
1870 2533 763 9231
4593 222 2078 10946
Table 9. Sequence in which cases are shown in the treatments good advice, bad advice, bail advice, and jail
advice in Study 2. The values correspond to the Case ID column in Table 8.
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A.1 Stimulus Material
The stimulus material in our experiments consists of vignettes of the following form:
Defendant Description.
The defendant is a <sex> aged <age>. They have been charged with: <crime>. This
crime is classified as a <misdemeanor / felony>. They have been convicted of <non-
juvenile prior count> prior crimes. They have <juvenile felony prior count> juvenile
felony charges and <juvenile misdemeanor prior count> juvenile misdemeanor charges
on their record.
Machine Advice.
A computer program similar to the one used by judges in Broward County, Florida,
estimates that this defendant <will / will not> commit a crime in the next 2 years.
This computer program correctly predicts if a person will commit a crime in the next 2
years for 68% of defendants.
In Table 8, we list the full set of 50 vignettes used in our experiments. Screenshots of our survey
are shown in Figure 8.
Sequence in which cases are shown.
In Study 1, Study 3 and the feedback treatment in Study 2, the participants see the 50 cases in
random order. In the remaining four treatments in Study 2, they see the cases in a fixed order. The
precise sequences are reported in Table 9.
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